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THE PERSISTENT NATION STATE AND THE
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
Mark L. Movsesian*

One hears a great deal these days about the decline of the
nation state. The concept of a sovereign country whose inhabitants
share a common ancestry or culture is said to be obsolescent, if not
already obsolete. Several factors, apparently, are responsible: the
creation of supranational institutions like the European Union and
the World Trade Organization; the growing influence of nongovernmental organizations; the emergence of a new global economy;
and the formation of a worldwide consumer culture, to name just a
few.' The law, it is argued, must adapt.
The decline of the nation state is, of course, the premise that
underlies this conference. I question that premise. In my view, the
decline of the nation state is greatly exaggerated. There are good
reasons to believe that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the
nation state will remain "the building block[ ] of international relations" for the foreseeable future.2 Indeed, the force of nationalism
around the world, particularly among groups that do not yet have
their own states, suggests that the next century will see many new
entities asserting statehood and seeking admission to the community of nations.
An increase in the number of entities claiming to be states has
to implicate an interesting and largely unexplored
potential
the
question of United States jurisdiction. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (the "FSIA") confers on United States courts
jurisdiction of actions against a "foreign state."' 3 But what if the
"foreign state" is a new one that the President has not recognized?
Would jurisdiction exist in those circumstances? I argue in this
Article that, under the FSIA, United States courts have no jurisdic* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University. A.B., 1985, J.D., 1988, Harvard. I
thank Robin Charlow, Robert Delahunty, Eric Freedman, Ellen Hey, Jay Hickey, Eric
Lane, Richard Neumann, Peter Spiro, and Ven Walker for their comments on earlier
drafts, and my colleagues at the Hofstra Junior Faculty Workshop for helpful suggestions.
Connie Lenz of the Hofstra Law Library supplied research assistance, as did Anthony
Gallo, Hofstra Law School Class of 1996. Support for this work was provided by a grant
from Hofstra University.
1 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 22-41.
2 William Alonso, Citizenship, Nationality and Other Identities, 48 J. INrr'L AiF. 585,
599 (1995).
3

28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1994).
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tion of actions against an unrecognized foreign state. I argue further that this reading of the FSIA comports with sound policy.
THE PERSISTENT NATION STATE

The story of the rise of the nation state is by now familiar, and
I will only sketch its broad outline here. By most accounts, the
idea of the sovereign state, an entity exercising "supreme legitimate authority within a [defined] territory,"5 grew out of the Protestant Reformation. 6 Medieval Europe was, at least in theory, a
single, unified polity, a Respublica Christiana"in which each individual found his definition, identity and purpose, where all lived in
common under the same law and morals and where none was severed or independent in his authority or beliefs."'7 Loyalties were
distributed among numerous, interdependent, authorities: the Pope
and the Holy Roman Emperor as well as various "nobles, kings,
and clerics."'8 Exclusive territorial sovereignty did not exist. "Both
the [P]ope and the [E]mperor intervened regularly in the territorial
affairs" of kings and princes, particularly in religious matters. 9
4 I focus on the European experience, which provides the basis for most scholarship on
nationalism and sovereignty, and from which the law of nations derives. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1979) ("Despite its claims to
universality, the early law of nations had its origins in the European State-system."); see
also JAMES MAYALL, NATIONALISM AND

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 1

(1990) ("[T]he global

system of world politics is historically derived from the European states-system as it developed between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries."). For an account of how the European model of statehood spread to other continents and cultures, see ROBERT H.
JACKSON, QUASI-STATES 59-81 (1990).

5 Daniel Philpott, Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History, 48 J. INT'L AFF. 353,
357 (1995) (emphasis omitted). Scholars sometimes draw a distinction between "external"
sovereignty, which relates to a state's authority with respect to other states, and "internal"
sovereignty, which relates to a state's authority within its own territory. See Donat
Pharand, Perspectives on Sovereignty in the Current Context: A Canadian Viewpoint, 20
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 19, 20-21 (1994). These "are not distinct types of sovereignty, but complementary, always coexistent, aspects of sovereignty." Philpott, supra, at 357; see also ALAN
JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD 52 (1986) (arguing that state's external and internal standing are aspects of unitary sovereignty).
6 See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 4, at 50 ("Sovereign states first came into view when
medieval Christendom fractured under the combined impact of the Renaissance and the
Reformation.").
7 Philpott, supra note 5, at 360; see also Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and
InternationalLaw, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1685, 1687 (1995) (discussing medieval concept
of Respublica Christiana).
8 J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and
the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations, 48 INT'L ORG. 107, 111 (1994); see
GIDON GOTTLIEB, NATION AGAINST STATE

37-38 (1993).

9 Philpott, supra note 5, at 361. As Pope Boniface VIII argued in 1302, in a dispute
with Philip IV of France, "'[sjpiritual power exceeds any earthly power in dignity and nobility, as spiritual things exceed temporal ones ....
If, therefore, the earthly power err, it

THE PERSISTENT NATION STATE

1996]

1085

All this changed with the Peace of Westphalia that ended the
Thirty Years War in 1648.10 The terms of the settlement greatly
curtailed the prerogatives of the Pope and Emperor and made

clear that sovereignty resided in the territorial state. The treaty
conferred on states authority to form alliances on equal terms without imperial or papal approval." Even more important, perhaps,
the Peace of Westphalia clarified that a state had exclusive authority with regard to the question that had instigated the war. Under
the principle of cuius regio, euis religio,'2 a prince was given the

power to determine the religion that would be practiced within his
territory-a power with which neither Pope nor Emperor could legitimately interfere. 13 After Westphalia, religion was strictly an internal matter. Indeed, "as it came to be practiced," the settlement
"removed all legitimate restrictions on a state's activities within its
14

territory.'
If the seventeenth century produced the sovereign state, the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the rise of nationalism. 15
shall be judged by the spiritual power. .. ."' Eric Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A
Change in the World Legal Order, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 269, 272 (1978) (alteration in
original).
10 See HANS KOHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM 188 (1944). On the Thirty Years War,
see C.V. WEDGWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR (1938).
11 See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 113 (1990)

("The notion of the sovereign equality of states may be said to have made its debut, in
modern Western civilization, with the Peace of Westphalia."); Brand, supra note 7, at 1688
(explaining that Peace of Westphalia formalized "[a] new era of equal sovereigns"); Lane,
supra note 9, at 270 (noting "Westphalian emphasis on territorial sovereignty and sovereign equality"); cf Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1907, 1926 (1992) ("Overall ... it
remains the rule in the late twentieth century that a sovereign, having fulfilled the formal
requirements of statehood, is equal to any other sovereign.") (footnote omitted).
12 The principle of cuius regio, euis religio, "'whose the region, his the religion,"' had
been recognized in the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, but was not put into practice until the
Peace of Westphalia almost 100 years later. Philpott, supra note 5, at 363.
13 Cf. Lane, supra note 9, at 275 (noting that parties to Peace of Westphalia "chose to
ignore the papal bull condemning the ... inclusion of clauses granting religious freedom")
(footnote omitted).
14 Philpott, supra note 5, at 364.
15 Recent years have seen a surge in scholarship on nationalism, a complex social and
intellectual phenomenon that eludes easy explanation. For examples of this scholarship,
see BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (rev. ed. 1991); JOHN BREUILLY, NA.
TIONALISM AND THE STATE (2d ed. 1994); ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM

(1983); GOTrLIEB, supra note 8; LIAH GREENFELD, NATIONALISM (1992); E.J. HOBSBAWM,
NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 (1990); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING (1993); WILLIAM PFAFF, THE WRATH OF NATIONS (1993); ANTHONY D. SMITH,
THE ETHNIC ORIGINS OF NATIONS (1986); YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM (1993);

Lea Brilmayer, The Moral Significance of Nationalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 7 (1995);
Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and
Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 (1996). The classic study remains KOHN, supra note 10.
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Nationalism, which may be defined as a political movement that
seeks to unite a people identified by common ancestry or culture
with a sovereign state,16 reordered the psychological allegiances of
Europe and gave to the state an emotional appeal it had previously
lacked." While the medieval world had been characterized by
unity, 18 eighteenth- and nineteenth-century nationalism glorified
particularity; in place of fellowship in the universal Respublica
Christiana,it substituted membership in the nation. By fostering a
sense of "belonging,"19 of shared participation in a unique, sometimes mythical, heritage,20 eighteenth- and nineteenth-century nationalism provided the basis for powerful new political identities:
French, German, and Italian, of course, but also Croatian, Greek,
and Serbian. The strength of these new identities, these new emotional attachments to the state, may be seen in the German and
Italian unification movements; in the nationalist struggles that culminated in the First World War; and, of course, in the21resistance to
two totalitarian ideologies, fascism and communism.
But all this is history. Nationalism today is said to be a spent
force; the order of nation states, an ancien regime.22 One hears
For a perceptive essay that summarizes much of the recent scholarship, see Tony Judt, The
New Old Nationalism, N.Y. REV.BOOKS, May 26, 1994, at 44.
16 See BREUILLY, supra note 15, at 2 ("The term 'nationalism' is used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist
arguments."); GELLNER, supra note 15, at 1 ("Nationalism is primarily a political principle,
which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent."); PFAFF, supra
note 15, at 197 ("Nationalism is the political ... expression of a form of group identity
attached to an existing state, or to a community which is not yet a recognized nation-state
but which believes that it should become one.").
17 See HAROLD J. LASKI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 15

(1921); see also KOHN, supra note 10, at 4 (asserting that nationalism "changed" the state
"by animating it with a new feeling of life and with a new religious fervor").
18 See LASKI, supra note 17, at 1-6.
19 See Nathan Gardels, 7lo Concepts of Nationalism: An Interview With Isaiah Berlin,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 21, 1991, at 19 (discussing Johann Gottfried Herder's concept of
cultural belonging). The sense of "belonging" remains an important part of nationalism's
appeal today. See Alan Branthwaite, The Psychological Basis of Independent Statehood, in
STATES IN A CHANGING WORLD 46, 51 (Robert H. Jackson & Alan James eds., 1993)
[hereinafter STATES IN A CHANGING WORLD].
20 Some have argued that nationalists fabricated many of the "traditions" they purported to restore. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST

MAN 269 (1992) (noting the "deliberate fabrications of nationalists, who had a degree of
freedom in defining who or what constituted a... nation"); Anthony D. Smith, Introduction: Ethnicity and Nationalism, in ETHNICrrY AND NATIONALISM 1, 3 (Anthony D. Smith
ed., 1992) (discussing "modernist" theories of nationalism).
21 See PFAFF,supra note 15, at 30.
22 See Judt, supra note 15, at 44 (describing recent conventional wisdom on passing of

nationalism); Richard W. Perry, The Logic of the Modern Nation-State and the Legal Construction of Native American TribalIdentity, 28 IND. L. REV. 547, 559-60 (1995) (same); see
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frequently of a "new medievalism" in world affairs, "a secular reincarnation of the system of overlapping... authority that characterized" pre-Reformation Europe.3 Scholars point out that states
have ceded sovereignty over significant social and economic questions to supranational institutions. Under the Treaty on European
Union, for example, the European Community has authority to
legislate in areas as diverse as industrial policy, consumer protection, and the environment; 24 the treaty contemplates monetary
union, with a single currency and a central bank, by the end of the
decade.2 5 The dispute-resolution procedures of the new World
Trade Organization, to give another example, make "adjudicatory
decisions automatically binding among.., member states in nearly
every case."'2 6 In this hemisphere, the North American Free Trade
Agreement has established a binational-panel mechanism that displaces domestic judicial review of antidumping and countervailing
duty cases.27
Supranational institutions are not the only beneficiaries of the
new medievalism. For some time, scholars have been remarking
on the growing influence of nongovernmental organizations, or
"NGOs," on world affairs. 28 The "heightened permeability of national borders," the argument goes, along with great improvements
also FUKUYAMA, supra note 20, at 271-75 (stating reasons why, despite its "new manifesta-

tions," nationalism will ultimately fade as a political force); HOBSBAWM, supra note 15, at
163 (arguing that nationalism "is no longer a major vector of historical development").
23 HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 264 (1977); see also Peter J. Spiro, New
Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making
Institutions, WASH. Q., Winter 1995, at 45, 46 ("It is almost as if the world has arrived at a
sort of neomedievalism in which the institutions and sources of authority are multifarious."); Susan Strange, The Defective State, DAEDALUS, Spring 1995, at 55, 56 (discussing
"the 'new medievalism"'); cf Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigmfor InternationalLaw?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 447, 453 (1993) ("[W]e
should adjust our intellectual framework to a multi-layered reality consisting of a variety of
authoritative structures.").
24 Michael H. Abbey & Nicholas Bromfield, A Practitioner'sGuide to the Maastricht
Treaty, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1329, 1332 (1994).
25 Frederic J. Jouhet, The Maastricht Treaty on European Union-Is Western Europe
Truly Getting Closer to Unity?, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 285, 289-93 (1995).
26 G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and InternationalRelations Theory: An Analysis of
the World Trade Organization,44 DUKE L.J. 829,925 (1995); see also id. at 848-53 (describing WTO dispute-resolution procedures); David W. Leebron, An Overview of the Uruguay
Round Results, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 15 (1995) (same).
27 See David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes Under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 407,430 (1993). For an argument that the binational-panel
mechanism violates the United States Constitution, see Jim C. Chen, Appointments with
Disaster: The Unconstitutionalityof Binational Arbitral Review Under the United StatesCanada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1455 (1992).
28 See, e.g., Ann Marie Clark, Non-Governmental Organizationsand Their Influence on
InternationalSociety, 48 J. INT'L AFF.507 (1995); Shell, supra note 26, at 911-12 & n.364;
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in electronic communication, "have allowed territorially dispersed
individuals to develop common agendas and objectives at the international level."' 29 As a result, NGOs like Amnesty International
and the World Wildlife Fund, which have worldwide memberships

devoted to discrete concerns, can have great impact on state policy. 30 Indeed, as my colleague Peter Spiro notes, some NGOs may
have more real power in the new order than states themselves:
Just as the leader of the Knights Templars or of the Franciscan
order outranked all but the most powerful of princes, so too the
secretary general of Amnesty International and the chief executive officer of Royal Dutch Shell cast far longer shadows on the
stage than do the leaders of Moldova, Namibia, or
international
31
Nauru.

Quite apart from the ascendance of nonstate actors, moreover,

economic and demographic trends are said to ensure the demise of
the nation state. The "globalization" of trade and finance 3 2 it is
argued, precludes states from controlling their economies as they
once did.33 National boundaries no longer constrain the movement
of capital. Today, even private investors routinely transfer money
abroad to take advantage of foreign opportunities.3 Multinational
corporations, which can relocate operations around the world with
little trouble, remain largely beyond the reach of state regulators. 5
International bond markets dictate the success or failure of domesSpiro, supra note 23, at 45; Strange, supra note 23, at 56; Panel, The Growing Role of
Nongovernmental Organizations,89 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 413 (1995).
29 Spiro, supra note 23, at 47; cf Walter B. Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty,
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer 1993, at 117, 120-23 (discussing impact of information
technology on sovereignty).
30 Clark, supra note 28, at 510, 512-13; Spiro, supra note 23, at 47; see also Elizabeth P.
Barratt-Brown, Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 519, 548-56 (1991) (describing NGOs' importance in monitoring
compliance with international human-rights laws).
31 Spiro, supra note 23, at 46.
32 Jost Delbrtck distinguishes "globalization" and "internationalization" as follows:
"globalization ... denotes a process of denationalization of clusters of political, economic
and social activities. Internationalization, on the other hand, refers to cooperative activities of national actors... on a level beyond the nation-state but in the last resort under its
control." Jost DelbrUck, Globalizationof Law, Politics,and Markets-Implicationsfor Domestic Law-A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 10-11 (1993).
33 See KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE 2-5 (1995); Richard B.
Bilder, Perspectives on Sovereignty in the Current Context: An American Viewpoint, 20
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 9, 13-14 (1994); Delbrilck, supra note 32, at 10; Wriston, supra note 29, at
125-26.
34 See OHMAE, supra note 33, at 2-3.
35 See id at 3; Vivien A. Schmidt, The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of
Business and the Decline of the Nation-State, DAEDALUS, Spring 1995, at 75, 76, 79.
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tic social programs. 36 And the mass migration of peoples, particularly from the developing world, makes it increasingly difficult for
states to retain effective control of their borders.37
Finally, there is the emergence of a new global consumer culture, a "McWorld" in which American products and idioms pervade the planet. 38 Everywhere, it seems, people watch the same
television programs, listen to the same music, eat the same food,
and wear the same clothes. 39 Just as nationalism reordered allegiances in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, consumerism is
said to do so today-but with opposite effect. Consumerism, it is
argued, is creating a new identity in which traditional loyalties, including loyalty to the nation state, are of relatively little impor-

tance.40 As a result of the mass marketing of a uniform popular

culture, Kenichi Ohmae writes, "[t]here are now ... tens of millions of teenagers around the world who ... have a lot more in

common with each other than they
do with members of older gen41
cultures."
own
their
in
erations
These arguments all have some validity. It would be fatuous

to suggest that the nation state has remained completely unaffected
by the changes of the last fifty years. And yet, in my view, the
decline of the nation state has been greatly exaggerated. Consider

first the claim about the ascendance of supranational organizations.
To be sure, supranational organizations exercise significant authority in some areas. But they remain, in essence, collections of sover36 The Economist relates the "possibly apocryphal" story of a piece of "graffiti seen on
a wall in Poland: 'We wanted democracy, but we ended up with the bond market."' Survey: The World Economy, ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 1995, at 3.
37 See Jost Delbrflck, Global Migration-Immigration-Multiethnicity:Challenges to
the Concept of the Nation-State, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 45, 54 (1994); Guy de
Lusignan, Global Migration and European Integration, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
179, 179 (1994).
38 BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 4 (1995); see Alonso, supra note 2, at
594.
39 See BARBER, supra note 38, at 60-72, 88-117; Alonso, supra note 2, at 594.
I cannot resist adding a personal anecdote. In the summer of 1995, I traveled to Armenia to participate in a judicial conference. One night, I decided to turn on the television
in my hotel room to see what Armenians were watching. My choices? A local news program, The Tonight Show With Jay Leno, CNN's coverage of the O.J. Simpson trial, and an
American business report, complete with stock quotes running at the bottom of the screen.
A restaurant I visited entertained diners with Michael Jackson videos.
40 See BARBER, supra note 38, at 17 (noting that common markets are producing "a
new breed of men and women for whom religion, culture, and ethnic nationality are marginal elements in a working identity"); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, Symposium Introduction: Nationalism, Identity, and Law, 28 IND. L. REv. 503, 507 (1995) (remarking that
international mass culture "includes a cluster of character traits" as well as an affinity for
"movies and blue jeans").
41 OHMAE,

supra note 33, at 15.
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eign states.4 2 The World Trade Organization, for example, "'can
override neither national laws nor national legislators.' ' 43 Despite
some Americans' fears of government from Geneva, decisions of
the Organization have no direct effect under United States law."4
Even the Treaty on European Union has not overcome the lingering attraction of state sovereignty. 5 Witness the continuing debate
about notions of "subsidiarity,"

and the confusion over the status

of Community law in domestic courts.47

42 See, e.g., Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization:A New Legal Order
for World Trade?, 16 MicH. J. INT'L L. 349, 355-56 (1995) (noting that the World Trade
Organization does not represent "the advent of a supranational trade institution with
power and authority to usurp sovereignty from its Member Nations"); Ian Ward, The European Constitution and the Nation State, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 173 (1996)
(book review) ("The [European] Community is still very much a community of nationstates pursuing, as their primary concern, their respective national-interests."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 cmt.
e (1987) ("States do not cease to be states because they have agreed not to engage in
certain international activities or have delegated authority to do so to a 'supranational'
entity .. ").
43 William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 427, 468 n.231 (1995) (quoting GAIT Director General
Peter Sutherland).
44 Id. at 468; see also Results of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations:Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1994) (testimony of John H. Jackson, Professor, University of Michigan Law School) (noting that decisions of the World
Trade Organization are not self-executing for purposes of United States law).
45 For an argument that the European Community was in fact designed to support,
rather than weaken, the nation states of Europe, see ALAN S. MILWARD, THE EUROPEAN
RESCUE OF THE NATION-STATE (1992).
46 The doctrine of subsidiarity, as set forth in the Treaty on European Union, provides
that the European Community shall take action "only if and in so far as the objectives of
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community." Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. G(5), 31 I.L.M. 247, 258. The
doctrine was formulated "to reassure Member State populations, and subcommunities
within those populations, that the Community's seemingly inexorable march toward
greater legal and political integration would not needlessly trample their legitimate claims
to democratic self-governance and cultural diversity." George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 331, 334 (1994). Despite the attempt to reassure, subsidiarity remains an
"elusive and sometimes deeply confusing" concept. Id. at 335; see also Gr~inne de Btlrca,
The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union, 59 MOD. L. REv. 349, 366-68 (1996)
(describing the differing views of subsidiarity held by European institutions).
47 While the European Court of Justice has stressed the need for uniformity and held
that Community law takes precedence over national law, see Karl M. Meessen, Hedging
European Integration: The MaastrichtJudgment of the Federal ConstitutionalCourt of Germany, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 511, 521 (1994), the German Federal Constitutional Court
has recently indicated that it, not the European Court of Justice, has authority to determine whether acts of European institutions "'exceed the sovereign powers transferred to
them."' Steve J. Boom, The European Union After the Maastricht Decision: Will Germany
Be the "Virginia of Europe?", 43 AM. J. Comp. L. 177, 177 (1995) (quoting German court's
opinion); see also Matthias Herdegen, Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court:

19961

THE PERSISTENT NATION STATE

1091

The impact of NGOs, likewise, has been overstated. Despite
their growing prominence, and the calls to give them "a significantly enhanced institutional role,"' the fact remains that NGOs
are powerless to effectuate anything on their own. To accomplish
their objectives, NGOs must work through other entities; and those
entities are, by and large, nation states.49 In Ann Marie Clark's
memorable phrase, NGOs are "tugboats in international channels": 50 their influence derives from their ability to persuade governmental actors to take certain positions. And while intellectuals
have been arguing since before the First World War that a communications revolution would create new identities of interest to supplant national allegiances, those predictions have yet to be
fulfilled . 5 1 National identities have proven quite durable. They
will likely survive the fax machine and the internet.

Nor do economic and demographic trends suggest that the
nation state is in inevitable decline. Despite increasing economic
interdependence, states retain a great deal of control over their

economies.52 Government spending, "the simplest gauge of [a]
state's involvement in the economy," has actually increased on average since 1980. 53 In the United States, government spending now

comprises thirty-three percent of gross domestic product; in WestConstitutional Restraintsfor an "Ever Closer Union", 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 235, 239
(1994) (arguing that German court's decision "amounts to quite a flat ... denial of the
absolute supremacy of Community law and its supreme judicial organ"). The status of
Community law in French courts is uncertain as well. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 200 (3d ed. 1995); Edward A. Tom-

linson, Reception of Community Law in France, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 183, 188 (1995).
48 Spiro, supra note 23, at 54; see also id. at 51-54 (advocating more formal recognition
of NGOs in international law).
49 Cf Clark, supra note 28, at 515 (describing how NGOs can "seek to change the
behavior of states through activity related to intergovernmental arenas"). Clark observes
that there is an "independent potential for NGO accomplishments outside of the intergovernmental realm," but that that potential is "more difficult to assess." Id. at 524.
50 Id. at 514.
51 Compare NORMAN ANGELL, THE GREAT ILLUSION 318 (4th rev. ed. 1913) ("[N]ever
before has it been possible, as it is possible by our means of communication to-day, to
offset a solidarity of classes and ideas against a presumed State solidarity.") with Spiro,
supra note 23, at 45 ("Dramatically multiplied transnational contacts at all levels of society
have ... created new commonalities of identity that cut across national borders and challenge governments at the level of individual loyalties."). For more on Norman Angell and
the International Polity movement, see infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
52 For an argument that economic interdependence has in fact become less threatening
to state sovereignty over time, see Stephen D. Krasner, Economic Interdependence and
Independent Statehood, in STATES INA CHANGING WORLD, supra note 19, at 301, 318.
53 The Myth of the Powerless State, ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 1995, at 15, 15. "Since 1980 the
public-spending ratio has increased, on average, from 36% of [gross domestic product] to
40%." Id.
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ern Europe, the percentages are even higher.54 Through favorable
tax treatment and other incentives, moreover, states can do much
to channel the flow of investment capital. 55 Many states continue
56
to impose restrictions on the exchange of national currencies.

And, with regard to migration patterns, states have shown little reluctance to exclude aliens they believe to be undesirable.57
In addition, those who argue that economic interdependence

will obliterate the nation state ignore an important historical lesson. Levels of direct foreign investment are in fact lower now than
they were at the turn of the century.58 Indeed, right up until the
outbreak of the First World War, Norman Angell and other members of the International Polity movement were arguing that economic integration had made the nation state an anachronism. 59 In
his widely-read book, The Great Illusion,60 Angell asserted that

war was futile: given the "financial interdependence of the capitals
of the world," he wrote, one state could gain nothing by military
action against another.6 1 Financial interdependence did not pre-

vent the cataclysm of 1914, and the nation state remains with us
today.
54 Id. In Germany, public spending comprises forty-nine percent of gross domestic
product; in Sweden, sixty-eight percent. Id.
55 See Vincent Cable, The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic
Power, DAEDALUS, Spring 1995, at 23, 40. As Ian Ward points out, the Treaty on European Union conspicuously omits any reference to the possibility of tax harmonization
among the member states. Ward, supra note 42, at 171.
56 Paul B. Stephan III, BarbariansInside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745, 760 (1995).
57 See Cable, supra note 55, at 38-39.
58 Krasner, supra note 52, at 312-13. Louis Pauly writes that "[c]onditions approximating what is now commonly, if hyperbolically, referred to as 'global finance' existed before
1914 between the most advanced economies and their dependencies." Louis W. Pauly,
CapitalMobility, State Autonomy and PoliticalLegitimacy, 48 J. Irr'L Ai'. 369, 371 (1995).
The conventional wisdom that "increased international capital mobility" leads to a loss of
sovereignty, Pauly argues, "downplays the stark historical lesson of 1914: Under conditions
of crisis, the locus of ultimate political authority in the modern age-the state-is laid
bare." Id at 373.
59 See NORMAN ANGELL, THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITY 93-94 (1914);
J.D.B. MILLER, NORMAN ANGELL AND THE FUTILTY OF WAR 6-10, 25 (1986).

60 The Great Illusion, which Angell first published in 1910, "was translated into at least
seventeen languages" and sold more than one million copies. MILLER, supra note 59, at 8.
61 ANGELL, supra note 51, at 54. David Starr Jordan, President of Stanford University
and a follower of Angell, went even further in 1913:
"What shall we say of the Great War of Europe, ever threatening, ever impending, and which never comes? We shall say that it never will come. Humanly
speaking, it is impossible .... The bankers will not find the money for such a
fight, the industries will not maintain it, the statesmen cannot .... There will be
no general war."
MILLER, supra note 59, at 9.
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Finally, there is the matter of the global consumer culture. An
examination of world events makes clear that this culture lacks sufficient power to overcome the appeal of nationalism. Everywhere
one sees "new states and nations striving to become states": 62 in
the former Eastern bloc; 63 in Western Europe;6 and in North
America. 65 Indeed, nationalist sentiments have a way of turning up
where one might least expect them. Italy's Northern League, for
example, which enjoys significant support in places like Venice and
Treviso, advocates an independent state called "Padania." 66 Catalonia demands, and receives, increasing autonomy in Spain.67 And
Scottish nationalists have obtained the promise of a restored Scottish Parliament-dissolved almost 300 years ago-in the event the
Labour Party wins the next general election in Britain.68
As a powerful ordering force in peoples' lives, then, national-

ism seems likely to remain with us. And here it is important to
remember something one can easily forget when thinking about
the "new medievalism." The unity of medieval society derived

from a sense of common identity, of fellowship in the Respublica
Christiana.69 To overcome the powerful attachments nationalism
creates, one would need to discover, or invent, a new shared iden-

tity. 7° "Consumer" seems a poor candidate. People who drink
Coca-Cola do not cease to think of themselves as Croats or Serbs.

62 Delbrock, supra note 32, at 12.
63 Consider the situation in Chechnya, see Ttent N. Tappe, Note, Chechnya and the
State of Self-Determination in a Breakaway Region of the Former Soviet Union: Evaluating
the Legitimacy ofSecessionist Claims, 34 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255 (1995), and in "the
self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic of 'Sprska."' Kadic v. Karadtid, 70 F.3d 232, 236
(2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996).
64 On the nationalist backlash in Western Europe, see BARBER, supra note 38, at 11;
MICHAEL J. BAUN, AN IMPERFECr UNION 130 (1996).

65 In Quebec, a separatist referendum narrowly failed in the fall of 1995. Clyde H.
Farnsworth, Quebec, by Razor-Thin Margin, Votes 'No' on Leaving Canada, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 1995, at Al. A recent poll reveals that sixty percent of Quebecers expect the
province to be independent within a decade. Clyde H. Farnsworth, Quebec Separatist Becomes Premier, Pledging Economic Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1996, at A7.
66 See Celestine Bohlen, Italian's Call for Breakup Stirs Storm, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
1996, § 1, at 4; Roots of Secession, ECONOMIST, May 25, 1996, at 53.
67 See Marlise Simons, Catalan Leader Holds Keys to Madrid, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1996,
§ 1, at 10.
68 John Darnton, Nationalist Winds Blow Hot in the Highlands, Warming Scots to Separation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1995, at A6.
69 See supra text accompanying note 7.
70 A Romanian intellectual and government minister, Andrei Plesu, put it this way:
The consciousness of unity is stronger in Europe than anywhere else in the
world. This is explained by the homogeneity of Europe in the Middle Ages,
due to Christianity. This Christian Europe no longer exists. What will tie Eu-
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In sum, the nation state is not about to disappear. Indeed, if
current trends continue, we should expect to see any number of
new entities assert statehood in the future. This, in turn, would
raise an interesting and largely unexplored question of United
States jurisdiction. States today routinely engage in commercial
transactions.7' Just like "'private player[s] within' the market, 72
they enter into contracts for the purchase of necessary goods and
services. As American firms expand their overseas operations,
therefore, they increasingly do business with foreign states.73
Not every deal works out, of course; 74 and this is where the
question of United States jurisdiction can become important. Assume that a foreign state enters into a contract with an American
firm and subsequently defaults. As we shall see, where the state is
one that the President has recognized, the firm can bring suit
against it in an American court.75 But what if the firm made the
contract with a new state that the President has declined to recognize?76 Would jurisdiction exist in those circumstances? I address
that complicated question in the next section of this article.
THE UNRECOGNIZED STATE AND THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITIES ACT

77
To understand the issues raised when an American firm
brings suit against an unrecognized foreign state in a United States
court, consider the following hypothetical case. 8 In the aftermath
rope together in the future? The [European currency unit]? That... solution

appears to me romantic.
PFAFF, supra note 15, at 82-83.
71 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS

199 (3d ed. 1996).
72 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360 (1993) (quoting Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)).
73 This development was noted as long as twenty years ago, when Congress enacted the
FSIA. See S. REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
74 See BORN, supra note 71, at 199 (noting that commercial cases involving foreign
states "arise with considerable frequency in contemporary international litigation").
75 See infra text accompanying note 133.
76 There are reports that American and European firms have already begun making
contracts with the self-proclaimed state of "Sprska." See Chris Hedges, A U.S. Firm is Said
to Deal With a Serb Tied to Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1996, at A9; Harriet Martin & Jim
Kelly, KPMG Has Agreed to Help, Says Karadzic, FIN. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at 2.
77 Although the hypothetical case involves an American plaintiff, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 also confers jurisdiction of actions brought by foreign plaintiffs against foreign states. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
78 This Article does not address a related, and complicated, question: whether, in litigation between private parties, a United States court should give effect to the acts of an
unrecognized state. "The courts have differentiated between acts of unrecognized govern-
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of the breakup of the Soviet empire, a little-known region in central Europe declares itself a state: let's call it the State of
"Freedonia."7 9 Freedonia has well-defined borders, a permanent
population of roughly two million, and a stable government that
has begun to exchange ambassadors with neighboring states.
Nonetheless, the President of the United States has declined to rec-

ognize Freedonia. Indeed, the President has announced that it is
United States policy to have no official contacts with anyone claiming to represent the new state.
Freedonia decides to increase its military preparedness by obtaining a new supply of boots for members of its armed forces. Accordingly, persons acting as agents for Freedonia travel to the
United States to negotiate a purchase contract with an American

shoe manufacturer.80 After a long bargaining session, the parties
sign an agreement at the manufacturer's American headquarters.
Freedonia later decides to back out of the deal, however, and in-

forms the manufacturer that it will not pay for the boots it has ordered. The manufacturer, who faces a grave loss on the contract,
brings suit against Freedonia for breach in federal district court."'

Freedonia moves to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
What result?
The answer depends on the operation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (the "FSIA"),82 a comprehensive statute that "provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a
ments 'dealing solely with private, local and domestic matters,' to which they give effect,
and acts 'with respect to matters extending beyond the borders' of the unrecognized entity

to which they refuse effect."

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §

205

reporters' note 3 (1987) (quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F.
Supp. 892,900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
905 (1971)).
79 I choose this name to avoid offending sensibilities-except, perhaps, those of Marx
Brothers's fans. Cf DUCK Soup (Paramount 1933) (comedy set in fictitious state of
Freedonia).
80 These persons would presumably enter the United States on nonimmigrant visas. By
law, persons applying for nonimmigrant visas must present valid passports issued by a
"competent authority." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(30) (1994). As interpreted by the State Department, "[t]he term 'competent authority' ... means an official duly authorized to issue
passports by the government of the issuing country; it is not linked with a recognition of
that country's government by the United States." 1 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE

§ 12.04[2], at 12-22 (rev. ed. 1994). Accord-

ingly, these persons might enter the United States on "Freedonian" passports.
Alternatively, they might possess passports issued by a third country.
81 On the possibility of suing a foreign state in state court, see infra note 149.
82 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994)).
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foreign state" in United States courts.83 The FSIA comprises a
confusing network of interrelated provisions, four of which are relevant for our purposes: sections 1330, 1603, 1604, and 1605 of title
28 of the United States Code. Section 1604 provides that a "foreign state" shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the district

courts except as provided in the FSIA.84 Section 1330(a), in turn,
provides that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any action against a "foreign state ...

with respect to which the

foreign state is not entitled to immunity under" the FSIA.85 As the
Supreme Court has explained, these two provisions "work in tandem: [section] 1604 bars federal.., courts from exercising jurisdiction when a foreign state is entitled to immunity" under the FSIA,
"and [section] 1330(a) confers jurisdiction on district courts to hear
suits brought by United States citizens .. when a foreign state is
not entitled to immunity" under the FSIA. 86
When is a foreign state entitled to immunity under the FSIA?
The FSIA reflects what is known as the "restrictive" theory of foreign sovereign immunity.8 7 Under that theory, a foreign state is

immune from the jurisdiction of domestic courts with respect to its
"public" or "sovereign" activities (jure imperii), but not its "private" or "commercial" activities (jure gestionis),88 Accordingly,
section 1605(a)(2) provides that "[a] foreign state shall not be im83 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989).
84 In full, section 1604 provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
85 In full, section 1330(a) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity under either sections 16051607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1994).
86 Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 434.
87 See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983).
88 BORN, supra note 71, at 201-02. For much of our history, the United States held to
the "absolute" theory of foreign sovereign immunity, under which a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of domestic courts with respect to all its activities, public and
private. See id at 200. In practice, courts usually deferred to the State Department's recommendation whether a foreign state should be granted immunity; "the State Department
ordinarily requested immunity in all actions against friendly foreign sovereigns." Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486. In 1952, however, the State Department announced that it would
follow the restrictive approach. See Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign
Immunity to Foreign Governments, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 23, 1952, at 984, 985.
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mune from the jurisdiction" of the district courts "in any case.., in
which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state."8 9 The FSIA defines "commercial activity" by reference to its "nature," not its "purpose. ' 9°
Where a state acts as a private player in the market, as by purchasing goods from a vendor, it engages in commercial activity regardless of its motivation for doing so.91 That the state ultimately will
use the goods for a "governmental purpose does not alter the commercial character of the activity." 92

Applying these provisions of the FSIA to our hypothetical
case, it seems at first glance that there is subject-matter jurisdiction
of the manufacturer's action against Freedonia. In negotiating and
signing the purchase contract at the manufacturer's American
headquarters, Freedonia carried on a commercial activity in the
United States; 93 that Freedonia will use the goods for a governmental purpose does not, as we have seen, alter the commercial nature
of its activity. 94 The manufacturer's action for breach is "based
upon" Freedonia's commercial activity. 95 And, as the manufacturer's claim is one with respect to which Freedonia is not entitled
to immunity under the FSIA, section 1330(a) would seem to confer
jurisdiction on the district court.
But there is a lurking problem that we have not addressed. By
its terms, section 1330(a) confers jurisdiction only with regard to
actions against a "foreign state."96 Would Freedonia qualify?
89 In full, section 1605(a)(2) provides:

A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case - in which the action is based upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
90 The FSIA defines "commercial activity" as follows:
A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial conduct
or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an
activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct
or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1994).
91 See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360 (1993).
92 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §

453 cmt. b (1987).

93 See BORN, supra note 71, at 244-45, 258-59.
94 Indeed, a foreign state's purchase of boots for its armed forces is a classic example of
commercial activity for purposes of the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.
See id. at 236.
95 See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 357.

96 See supra note 85.
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Freedonia meets many of the traditional tests for statehood under
international law: it has a defined territory, a permanent population, and a stable government that has begun to exchange ambassadors with neighboring states. 97 But the President has declined to
recognize the new state. Would this lack of recognition preclude
Freedonia from qualifying as a "foreign state" for purposes of the
FSIA? Can an unrecognized state be subject to suit in a United
States court?
The FSIA's definition of "foreign state," contained in section
1603(a), is silent on the issue. Section 1603(a) provides simply that,
for purposes of the FSIA, a "foreign state" shall include political
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. 98 Only a few courts
have considered the question, 99 and none has given it a great deal

of thought.1 °0 A good example is Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille
97 "Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has
the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201; see also 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 34 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM]
(discussing criteria for statehood under international law).
The Third Restatement reflects the "declaratory" theory of statehood, which holds
that an entity becomes a state, regardless of recognition by other states, when it meets the

objective requirements of statehood. See RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW § 202 reporters' note 1. Another theory holds that recognition by other states is essential to establish statehood. Under this theory, recognition is "constitutive." Id. While
the majority of scholars favors the declaratory theory, CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 22,
there remains no settled definition of statehood under international law. Id.at 31; see also
1 OPPENHEIM, supra, at 128 (noting absence of settled view on necessity of recognition to
establish statehood). For more on the declaratory and constitutive theories, see infra text
accompanying notes 154-57.
98 In full, section 1603(a) provides: "A 'foreign state,' except as used in section 1608 of
this title, includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b)." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1994). Section 1608
relates to service of process. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1994).
I should note that the legislative history of the FSIA also sheds no light on the question. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 13 n.78 (1988). I have argued against relying on legislative history for indications
of legislative intent in the context of severability doctrine. See Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41, 71-73 (1995).
99 E.g., Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991); Morgan Guar.
Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991), vacating 639 F. Supp. 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Millen Indus. v. Coordination Council for N. Am. Affairs, 855 F.2d 879
(D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Julius H. Hines, Note, Why Do Unrecognized Governments Enjoy
Sovereign Immunity? A Reassessment of the Wulfsohn Case, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 717, 737
(1991) (noting that "[ljitigation against states with unrecognized governments has been
relatively uncommon in recent years").
100 See Hines, supra note 99, at 745 (noting that "[n]o case has devoted much analytical
energy to the FSIA's definition of 'foreign state"').
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Lauro, which the Second Circuit decided in 1991.101 Plaintiffs in

Klinghoffer were passengers on the Italian cruise ship Achille
Lauro, which Palestinian terrorists hijacked in 1985.102 Plaintiffs

sued the ship's owner and other defendants in federal district court,
alleging, among other things, that defendants had negligently failed
to prevent the terrorist attack. °3 Defendants, in turn, brought an
impleader action against the Palestine Liberation Organization
(the "PLO"), which had reportedly instigated the hijacking. 04 Defendants sought indemnification from the PLO, as well as "damages for tortious interference with their businesses.' 10 5
The PLO argued that, as an unrecognized foreign state, it
could not be subject to suit in a United States court. °6 The Second
Circuit disagreed. To begin, the court explained, the PLO met
none of the traditional requirements for statehood under international law: it had neither a defined territory nor a permanent population, and exercised no governmental authority. 10 7 Moreover, the
court continued, there was no merit to the assertion that an unrecognized state "lack[ed] the capacity to be sued in United States
courts."'' 08 Indeed, the court disposed of this argument in a single
sentence. "While unrecognized regimes are generally precluded
from appearing as plaintiffs in an official capacity without the Executive Branch's consent," the court stated, "there is no bar to suit
where an unrecognized regime is brought into court as a
defendant."1 9
The question is not so simple as the Klinghoffer court believed. Indeed, in my view, the best reading of section 1330(a) is
that it confers jurisdiction only with regard to actions against a recognized foreign state. To see why, one needs to appreciate a bit of
statutory history. Before 1976, when Congress enacted the FSIA,
jurisdiction of actions against a foreign state was conferred by a
provision of the diversity statute, the former section 1332(a)(2). 110
101 937 F.2d 44.
102 See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
103 Id.at 857.
104 Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 47. Some passengers brought separate actions against the
PLO. Id.
105
106
107
108

Id

Id at 47-48.
Id

Id at 48.
109 Id. (citations omitted). For more on a foreign sovereign's capacity to bring suit in a
United States court, see infra text accompanying notes 119-25.
110 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1970) (amended 1976). The amount-in-controversy requirement was $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs. § 1332(a) (1970).
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That provision granted the district courts jurisdiction of actions between "citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof."11' In the FSIA, Congress revised the former section
1332(a)(2) and divided it into three discrete provisions: 112 section
1330(a), which confers jurisdiction of actions against a "foreign
state;" 1 3 a new section 1332(a)(2), which confers jurisdiction of actions between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;""11 4 and a new section 1332(a)(4), which confers
jurisdiction of actions by a "foreign state" as plaintiff. 115 Nothing
in the FSIA-nor, for that matter, its legislative history"16 -suggests that any of these changes were substantive in nature.

In using the phrase "foreign state" in section 1330(a), then,
Congress simply borrowed language from the diversity statute. It
is a familiar maxim that, where Congress adopts statutory language
with a settled judicial construction, Congress means to adopt the
judicial construction as well. 117 And there is a long line of authority that construes the phrase "foreign state" for purposes of the
diversity statute. That line of authority makes clear that the phrase
refers exclusively to a state that the President has recognized."'
The phrase "foreign states" has appeared in the diversity statute since 1875. Act of
Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (conferring jurisdiction of controversies "between citizens of a State and foreign states, citizens, or subjects"). Before that, the statute
referred generically to "alien[s]," e.g., Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78, a term that
included foreign states. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1661 (3d ed. 1988).
111 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1970). Another subsection, not directly relevant here, conferred jurisdiction of actions between "citizens of different States and in which foreign
states or citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties." § 1332(a)(3) (1970) (amended
1976). This provision remains in force, as amended. § 1332(a)(3) (1994).
112 See Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Elecs., 468 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
113 See supra note 85.
114 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1994). The amount-in-controversy requirement is now
$50,000, exclusive of costs and interest. § 1332(a).
115 Section 1332(a)(4) confers jurisdiction of actions between "a foreign state, defined in
section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States." 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (1994).
116 See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976). As noted earlier, I have
argued against relying on legislative history for indications of legislative intent in the context of severability doctrine. See Movsesian, supra note 98, at 71-73.
117 See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 212 (1993); Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); Long v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
767 F.2d 1578, 1581 (9th Cir. 1985); New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. A.
Jesse Goldstein & Co., 276 F.2d 886, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1960).
11S See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 319-20 & n.19 (1978);
Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954); Land Oberoesterreich v.
Gude, 109 F.2d 635, 637 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 670 (1940); Transportes Aereos de
Angola v. Ronair, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 858, 862 (D. Del. 1982); Federal Rep. of Germany v.
Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747, 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v.
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For example, it has long been the rule that an unrecognized
state-or, for that matter, an unrecognized government of a recognized state" 9 -cannot bring suit in a United States court.12 0 This
rule follows from constitutional concerns. The Supreme Court has
indicated on numerous occasions that the Constitution gives the
President exclusive authority to recognize foreign sovereigns. 12 1 To
allow an unrecognized sovereign to have access to a United States
court, the theory goes, would impinge on the President's prerogative in this regard and possibly embarrass the nation's foreign relations. 22 To be sure, courts have occasionally permitted an
unrecognized sovereign to appear as plaintiff where the President

Elicofon, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974); Klausner v. Levy,
83 F. Supp. 599, 600 (E.D. Va. 1949); Betancourt v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 101

F. 305, 305-06 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900); 13B

CHARLES

A. WRIGHT ET

AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 3604, at 391 (2d ed. 1984).
119 The President can recognize the existence of a state, of course, without recognizing
the particular regime that claims to be its government. See Iran Handicraft & Carpet Export Ctr. v. Marjan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275, 1280 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that
United States recognized state of Iran but not Khomeini regime), affd mem., 868 F.2d
1267 (2d Cir. 1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 203 cmt. a.
Courts typically have not drawn a distinction between the recognition of states and governments for purposes of the diversity statute. But see Marjan, 655 F. Supp. at 1280-81. I
discuss this matter further, infra note 133.
120 See, e.g., Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 319-20; Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S.
126, 137 (1938); P & E Shipping Corp. v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 307
F.2d 415, 417 (1st Cir. 1962); Lori F. Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution,73 VA.
L. REV. 483, 499 (1987).
121 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964); Kennett v.
Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 50-51 (1852); Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246,
324 (1818); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 272 (1808); see also JOHN G. HERVEY,
AND PROCEDURE

THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AS INTERPRETED BY THE

COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES

25-53 (1928) (discussing early cases on recognition); Ed-

win D. Dickinson, The Unrecognized Government or State in English and American Law
(pt. 1), 22 MICH. L. REv. 29, 31-39 (1923) (same).
An extensive discussion of the various arguments in support of the President's exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns lies beyond the scope of this article. Courts
have stressed the President's responsibilities with regard to foreign affairs; the need for a
uniform foreign policy; and the political nature of recognition. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
410-11; Kennett, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 50-51; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 204 cmt. a (1987); Mary B. West & Sean D. Murphy, The Impact on U.S.
Litigation of Non-Recognition of Foreign Governments, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 435, 441-42
(1990). For an exhaustive exposition, see W.L. Penfield, Recognition of a New State-Is it
an Executive Function?, 32 AM. L. REv. 390 (1898). For an argument that the traditional
view on recognition improperly slights the judicial role, see Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL AsPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1933).
122 See Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 410 (referring to "possible incongruity of judicial 'recognition,' by permitting suit"); Ronair, 544 F. Supp. at 862-63; Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 139 N.E. 259, 262 (N.Y. 1923).
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has specifically indicated his willingness that the suit go forward. 123
But the rule remains one "of complete judicial deference to the
Executive Branch.' ' 2 4 As the Court has explained, "[i]t is within
the exclusive power of the Executive Branch to determine which
nations are entitled to sue" in United States courts. 25
Similarly, courts traditionally have held that, under the diversity statute, only citizens of recognized states can appear as parties
to litigation. 126 In one leading case, for example, the court dismissed a suit brought by a resident of what was then the British
mandate of Palestine.'27 The President did not recognize the territory as the state of Israel until months after plaintiff had brought
the suit, the court noted. 128 As a result, plaintiff was not a citizen
of a "foreign state" at the time he filed the action. 129 In another,
the court permitted residents of India to bring suit where, "[t]o all
intents and purposes," the President had recognized that state as
"an independent international entity" at the time plaintiffs had
filed the complaint. 130 And, in a third case, the court dismissed an
action against a citizen of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.' 31 The United States had not recognized its independence,
the court explained; the Trust Territory was not a "foreign state"
for purposes of the diversity statute. 32
For purposes of section 1330(a), then, the phrase "foreign
state" must have the same meaning it has long had for purposes of
the diversity statute: a state the President has recognized. It fol123 E.g., National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 555
(2d Cir. 1988) (jurisdiction where United States filed statement of interest that "'it is the
position of the Executive Branch that the Iranian government . . . should be afforded access to our courts for purposes of resolution of the instant dispute"'), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1081 (1989); Ronair, 544 F. Supp. at 863 (jurisdiction where State Department took position that allowing standing for Angolan agency "would be consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United States").
124 Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 320.
125 h&

126 See, e.g., Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954); Chang v.
Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975, 977 (N.D. Ill.
1980); Windert Watch Co.
v. Remex Elecs., 468 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); World Communications Corp. v.
Micronesian Telecommunications Corp., 456 F. Supp. 1122, 1124 (D. Haw. 1978); Klausner
v. Levy, 83 F. Supp. 599, 600 (E.D. Va. 1949); Betancourt v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Ass'n, 101 F. 305, 305-06 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900); see 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 118,
§ 3604, at 391.
127 Klausner, 83 F. Supp. at 600.
128 Id.
129

Id.

130 Murarka, 215 F.2d at 552.
131 World Communications Corp. v. Micronesian Telecommunications Corp., 456 F.
Supp. 1122, 1123 (D. Haw. 1978).
132 Id at 1124.
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lows that section 1330(a) confers jurisdiction only with respect to
actions against a recognized foreign state: under the FSIA, a
United States court has no jurisdiction of an action against an unrecognized foreign state.133 This interpretation of the FSIA comports with an earlier view of foreign sovereign immunity-one that
predates enactment of the FSIA-that held that an unrecognized
sovereign was immune from the jurisdiction of domestic courts.
The leading case is Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet

Republic, which the New York Court of Appeals decided in
1923.134
Plaintiff in Wulfsohn was an American citizen who had stored
some furs in Russia. 135 The Soviet government confiscated the
furs, and plaintiff brought a tort action for conversion in the New
York courts. 36 Although the United States had not yet recognized

it, the Soviet regime argued that it was the de facto government of
133 The President cannot recognize the government of a state he does not acknowledge
to exist. Where the President declines to recognize a foreign state, therefore, it follows
that he also declines to recognize its "government." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-

EIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 203 cmt. a (1987).

A plaintiff might argue that, while the unrecognized state itself is immune from United
States jurisdiction, its unrecognized "government" is amenable to suit under the diversity
statute as an unincorporated foreign association. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro,
739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
One can readily identify at least three problems with this approach. First, "as interpreted
by the Supreme Court," the diversity statute "requires that the citizenship of every member of an unincorporated association be considered for jurisdictional purposes." Kevin R.
Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? HistoricalFoundationsand Modern Justificationsfor
Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 59-60
(1996). As a result, for jurisdiction to exist, each member of the unrecognized government
would need to be the citizen of a recognized foreign state. See supra text accompanying
note 118. In any given case, this might be a difficult requirement to meet. Second, as an
unrecognized government is unlikely to possess many assets apart from state property, the
plaintiff's recovery would be greatly limited. See Hines, supra note 99, at 754-55. Finally, a
court might hold that the political question doctrine precludes the exercise of jurisdiction
over a foreign government-even one that the President has not recognized. See John 0.
McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A
Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
293, 307-08 (1993) (noting that Supreme Court has largely ceded control over foreign affairs to Executive through application of political question doctrine).
134 138 N.E. 24 (N.Y. 1923). For authorities citing Wulfsohn with approval, see, e.g., TICHIANG CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 141-42 (1951); Edwin M.
Borchard, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 261,26465 (1932); Edwin D. Dickinson, The Unrecognized Government or State in English and
American Law (pt. 2), 22 MicH. L. REV. 118, 128 (1923); see also Hines, supra note 99, at
722 (noting that Wulfsohn rule has been adopted by "[s]everal international authorities").
For a contrary view, see Alfred Hayes, Private Claims Against Foreign Sovereigns, 38
HARV. L. REv. 599, 620 (1925).
135 Wulfson, 138 N.E. at 25.
136 Id
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Russia-a fact conceded by plaintiff137-and, as such, entitled to
immunity from suit in the United States. The Court of Appeals
agreed. A lawsuit against an unrecognized sovereign, the court
reasoned, had as much potential to "'vex the peace of nations"' as
one against a sovereign that the President had recognized:
In either case the hands of the state department would be tied.
Unwillingly it would find itself involved in disputes it might
think unwise.... The question is a political one, not confided to

courts, but to another department of government. Whenever an
act done by a sovereign in his sovereign character is questioned,
138
it becomes a matter of negotiation, or of reprisals, or of war.
As a consequence, the court believed, an unrecognized
sovereign
139
must possess immunity from suit in domestic courts.
With all this as background, return to our hypothetical case.
Recall that, under the terms of the hypothetical, the President has
declined to recognize Freedonia and has announced that it is the
policy of the United States to have no official contacts with anyone
claiming to represent the new state. 40 As a result, on my reading
of the FSIA, the manufacturer's claim against Freedonia must be
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As an unrecognized state, Freedonia is not subject to suit in a United States court.
For reasons I discuss below, this result may at first seem somewhat
odd. Nonetheless, I believe that my reading of the FSIA makes
sense, not only as a matter of statutory construction, but as a matter of policy as well.
One objection to my reading of the statute has to do with the
apparent advantage it confers on an unrecognized state. Return
again to our hypothetical case. Had the President recognized
Freedonia, the manufacturer's suit could have proceeded.' 4' In declining to recognize the new state, therefore, the President has conferred on Freedonia an immunity from suit it would not otherwise
possess. 42 Now, the facts do not indicate why the President has
declined to recognize Freedonia. His discretion in that regard is
43
exclusive, after all, and his reasons, strictly speaking, irrelevant.
Nonetheless, the mere fact that the President has declined to recognize the new state, and, indeed, has forbidden official contacts
137 Id

Id at 26.
139 See id
140 See supra p. 1093.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
142 See DELLAPENNA, supra note 98, at 18.
143 See discussion supra note 121 and accompanying text.
138
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with persons claiming to represent it, 1' does suggest disapproval.
Surely the President's failure
to recognize Freedonia was not
145
meant to confer a benefit?
This objection is specious. Immunity from suit is a handicap,
not an advantage, for an unrecognized state. This is so because
immunity creates a disincentive for American firms that wish to do
business with the state. Consider: An American firm that makes a
contract with a recognized foreign state has the assurance that, if
the foreign state breaches, the firm can file an action against it in a
United States court, a tribunal whose procedures and rules of decision are familiar and reasonably predictable. 46 Indeed, as the
Supreme Court has noted in another context, recognition is meant
to provide just such guidance for Americans who wish to do business abroad. "The very purpose of" recognition, the Court explained in Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 147 "is that our

nationals may be conclusively advised with what
government they
48
may safely carry on business transactions.'
See supra p. 1093.
Cf.Kadic v. Karadlid, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) ("It would be anomalous indeed if non-recognition by the United States, which typically reflects disfavor with a foreign regime ... had the perverse effect of shielding officials of the unrecognized regime
from liability for those violations of international law norms that apply only to state actors."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996). In Karad.id, plaintiffs brought suit against the
President of the unrecognized state of "Srpska," alleging that he had directed a campaign
of brutal violations of their human rights under international law. Id. at 236-37. Plaintiffs
asserted subject-matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, which grants district
courts jurisdiction of a "civil action by an alien for a tort ... committed in violation" of
international law. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). The court noted that "[tihe customary international law of human rights... applies to states without distinction between recognized and
unrecognized states," and concluded that plaintiffs' "allegations entitle[d] them to prove
that Karadlid's regime satisfies the criteria for a state, for purposes of those international
law violations requiring state action." Karadid,70 F.3d at 245.
As an action against a state official under the Alien Tort Statute, Karadei' is not directly relevant to the issues discussed in this article. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held
that the Alien Tort Statute does not provide a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction of an
action against a foreign state. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488
U.S. 428 (1989). With regard to the specific allegations in Karadt'ie, the Supreme Court
held in 1993 that the FSIA does not confer jurisdiction of actions that are based upon
claims of torture by state officials. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993). Just
this year, Congress amended the FSIA to provide that a foreign state shall not be immune
in certain cases alleging such conduct. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221(a), 110 Stat. 1214,
1241 (1996).
146 Cf.BORN, supra note 71, at 5 (noting disadvantages faced by a foreign litigant in an
unfamiliar forum). The American firm will also appreciate, no doubt, the comparative
advantage that plaintiffs enjoy in American courts. See id at 4-5.
147 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
1

145

148

Id. at 140.
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Now consider the situation with regard to an unrecognized
state. An American firm that makes a contract with an unrecognized state has no assurance that disputes will be resolved in a familiar forum. If the state should breach, the firm will need to look
elsewhere for relief: to the courts of the unrecognized state, perhaps, or the courts of a third country, if the contract includes an
appropriate forum-selection clause. 149 As a result, an unrecognized
state, like Freedonia in our hypothetical case, makes a less attractive business partner than a recognized state. Of course, the expected return on the contract may be such that the firm will wish to

proceed despite the state's immunity from United States jurisdiction. The point, though, is that the state's immunity is an obstacle
to be overcome, not a benefit.
Another objection to my reading of the statute has to do with
its emphasis on recognition. As I noted earlier, most international
legal scholars today subscribe to the declaratory theory of statehood, which holds that recognition is not essential to the establishment of a state.' 50 Under the declaratory theory, an entity
becomes a state, whether or not other states recognize it, when it
satisfies certain objective criteria: defined borders, a permanent
149 Because, on my reading of the FSIA, United States courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction of actions against unrecognized foreign states, the parties could not select a federal
forum. "[N]o action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal
court." Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982); see also Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After
Carnival Cruise: A Proposalfor CongressionalReform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 88 (1992)
(explaining that parties cannot agree to litigate a case in federal court unless there exists
some basis for subject-matter jurisdiction).
Could the parties select a state forum? The FSIA "clearly contemplates" that suits
against foreign sovereigns may be brought in state court. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank
of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983). The statute contains a provision authorizing a "foreign
state" to remove to federal court an action brought against it in state court, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(d), but, on my reading, that provision would apply only to a recognized foreign
state. Assuming that the unrecognized state did not enjoy immunity under section 1604,
then, see supra note 84, a state court arguably could exercise jurisdiction of an action
against it. The Supreme Court has indicated, though, that state law must give way when it
interferes with "foreign affairs and international relations-matters which the Constitution
entrusts solely to the Federal Government." Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968).
To allow a state court to exercise jurisdiction over an unrecognized sovereign could, as the
Wulfsohn court understood, disrupt United States foreign policy. See supra text accompanying notes 134-39 (discussing Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist FederatedSoviet Republic, 138
N.E. 24 (N.Y. 1923)); cf Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493 ("Actions against foreign sovereigns...
raise sensitive issues concerning the foreign relations of the United States."); id. at 497
(noting that, in enacting FSIA, "Congress deliberately sought to channel cases against foreign sovereigns away from the state courts and into federal courts, thereby reducing the
potential for a multiplicity of conflicting results among the courts of the 50 States"). A
further discussion of this complicated issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
150 See supra note 97.
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population, and so on. 151 Moreover, with respect to new governments, current United States practice tends to minimize the importance of formal recognition. 152 Why, then, should subject-matter

jurisdiction turn on recognition? If neither international law nor
domestic practice regards recognition as a signal event, why should
courts?
This objection has some merit. It is a familiar canon that statutes are to be construed, where possible, so as to conform with
principles of international law; 153 and were there a settled principle

that statehood does not depend on recognition, there would be a
good argument that the phrase "foreign state," for purposes of section 1330(a), should be read to apply to an unrecognized state. But
there is no such settled principle. Despite the popularity of the
declaratory theory, there is still "no generally accepted and satis-

factory modern legal definition of statehood.'1 54 Indeed, there is

significant support for a competing view of statehood, the constitutive theory, that holds that statehood is dependent on recognition. 55 As Thomas Franck observes, states continue to regard
recognition as an act of crucial symbolic importance. 156 Witness

157
the role of recognition in the current Balkan crisis.
Moreover, whatever its current practice with regard to governments, the United States continues to regard the recognition of
states as a significant exercise of discretion. 158 "'In the view of the
United States,"' the State Department has explained, "'international law does not require a state to recognize another entity as a

151 See id.
152 See National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 554 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081 (1989); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 203, reporters' note 1; West & Murphy, supra note 121, at 436. For a history
of United States practice with regard to the recognition of governments, see L. THOMAS
GALLOWAY, RECOGNIZnGJ

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

(1978). On the distinction between

the recognition of a government and the recognition of a state, see supra note 119.
153 See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); RE.
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 114.
154 CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 31; see also 1 OPPENHEIM,

supra note 97, at 128 (no

settled view on necessity of recognition).
155 See supra note 97. Lauterpacht famously attempted to reconcile the declaratory and

constitutive views by positing a duty to recognize a state that met the objective criteria
specified by international law. H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNION ININTERNATIONAL LAW
6 (1947). "[S]tate practice reveals that Lauterpacht's theory has not been adopted." MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (3d ed. 1991).
156 See FRANCc, supra note 11, at 112-16.
157 See Warren Zimmermann, The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapseof Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1995, at 2, 16-17 (describing role of European Commu-

nity's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in precipitating war in Bosnia).
158 FRANCK, supra note 11, at 124-26.
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state; it is a matter for the judgment of each state whether an entity
merits recognition." 1 59 And Presidents have traditionally employed the recognition of states as an important foreign-policy tool,
particularly in politically sensitive cases: Colombia in 1822; 160 Haiti
and the Dominican Republic in the 1860s;161 Panama in 1903;162
Manchukuo
in 1932;163 Israel in 1948; 164 and the Balkans in the
65
1990s.1 There is no reason to think that future Presidents will
cease to employ recognition in that fashion.
Indeed, if my earlier predictions are correct-if a number of
new entities assert statehood in the future'66-there will be many
more opportunities for the use of recognition as a tool of foreign
policy. As the Wulfsohn court realized, it is precisely with regard

to such sensitive questions that the President needs room to maneuver. 167 To permit an unrecognized state to appear as a party to
litigation in a United States court, even as defendant, might draw
the President into disputes he would rather avoid."6 It might force
him to make a decision on recognition at an inappropriate time, or
upset sensitive informal negotiations with the entity seeking recognition. In short, a lawsuit against an unrecognized state has the
potential greatly to disrupt the nation's foreign relations. 169 In a
159 Diplomatic Relations and Recognition, 1976 DIGEST § 3, at 19; see also FRANCK,
supra note 11, at 126 (explaining that United States asserts that recognition of a new state
"is entirely optional and governed by no rules except our political sensibilities or self-interest"); SHAW, supra note 155, at 247-48 (citing 1976 State Department statement as indicative of United States approach to recognition).
160 See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE RECOGNITION POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 134-38
(1915); JAFFE, supra note 121, at 104.
161 JAFFE, supra note 121, at 105-06.
162 GOEBEL, supra note 160, at 212-17.
163 SHAW, supra note 155, at 259-60; Leonard C. Meeker, Recognition and the Restatement, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 91-92 (1966).
164 Statement by the President Announcing Recognition of the State of Israel, PUB. PAPERS 258 (1948).
165 President Bush recognized the states of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia
in 1992. Statement on United States Recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republics, 1
PUB. PAPERS 553 (1992-93). President Clinton recognized the state of Macedonia in 1994.
U.S. Recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH,
Feb. 21, 1994, at 98.
166 See discussion supra p. 1092.
167 See Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 138 N.E. 24, 26 (N.Y.
1923). For a more detailed discussion of the Wulfsohn case, see supra text accompanying
notes 135-39.
168 See Wulfsohn, 138 N.E. at 26.
169 Cf Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) ("Actions
against foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues concerning the foreign relations of the United States . . ").
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confusing world of entities vying to become states, denying jurisdiction seems the more prudent approach.
CONCLUSION

The nation state is not in decline. Indeed, the strength of nationalism around the world suggests that we should expect a
number of new entities to assert statehood in the future. As I have
shown in this Article, American firms that do business with such
entities act at their peril. In the absence of presidential recognition, such entities fail to qualify as "foreign state[s]" for purposes
of the FSIA. As a result, they remain outside the jurisdiction of
United States courts: American firms with grievances must go elsewhere for relief. This conclusion is not only a matter of sound statutory construction. It is sound policy as well.

